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ABSTRACT  
 
Motivation is a major driver of project performance. Despite team member ability to deliver 
successful project outcomes if they are not positively motivated to pursue joint project goals, 
then performance will be constrained. One approach to improving the motivation of project 
organizations is by offering a financial reward for the achievement of set performance 
standards above a minimum required level. However, little investigation has been undertaken 
into the features of successful incentive systems as a part of an overall delivery strategy. 
 
With input from organizational management literature, and drawing on the literature covering 
psychological and economic theories of motivation, this paper presents an integrated 
framework that can be used by project organizations to assess the impact of financial reward 
systems on motivation in construction projects. The integrated framework offers four 
motivation indicators which reflect key theoretical concepts across both psychological and 
economic disciplines. The indicators are: (1) Goal Commitment, (2) Distributive Justice, (3) 
Procedural Justice, and (4) Reciprocity.  
 
The paper also interprets the integrated framework against the results of a successful 
Australian social infrastructure project case study and identifies key learning’s for project 
organizations to consider when designing financial reward systems. Case study results 
suggest that motivation directed towards the achievement of incentive goals is influenced not 
only by the value placed on the financial reward for commercial benefit, but also driven by 
the strength of the project initiatives that encourage just and fair dealings, supporting the 
establishment of trust and positive reciprocal behavior across a project team. The strength of 
the project relationships was found to be influenced by how attractive the achievement of the 
goal is to the incentive recipient and how likely they were to push for the achievement of the 
goal. Interestingly, findings also suggested that contractor motivation is also influenced by 
the fairness of the performance measurement process and their perception of the 
trustworthiness and transparency of their client. 
 
These findings provide the basis for future research on the impact of financial reward systems 
on motivation in construction projects. It is anticipated that such research will shed new light 
on this complex topic and further define how reward systems should be designed to promote 
project team motivation. Due to the unique nature of construction projects with high levels of 
task complexity and interdependence, results are expected to vary in comparison to previous 
studies based on individuals or single-entity organizations. 
 
Keywords: governance; inter and intra firm collaboration; motivation; financial rewards; 
construction projects 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Financial incentive reward systems aim to align the motivations of interdependent project 
stakeholders within a temporary project organization. This is achieved through client gain-
sharing, that is, by providing the contractor and/or consultants a share in the client’s success 
from the project. A key objective of financial incentives is motivation towards cost 
containment. Cost containment rewards are one of the most widely used forms of financial 
reward systems and can be applied to either fixed price, or modified cost reimbursable (cost-
plus) contracts, depending on how the incentive is structured (Russell, 2003). Generally, 
under a cost-plus incentive arrangement, the client’s target cost is introduced into a 
reimbursable contract. This acts as the fulcrum around which the cost containment 
mechanism is driven, savings achieved below the target cost are split between the contractor 
and client based on a predetermined share profile (Broome & Perry, 2002). The aim of this 
arrangement is to motivate the contractor and client to work together to minimize actual 
costs, as the contractor is able to maximize their profit margin by sharing the benefits of 
reduced project cost, and the client is motivated to minimize the total cost paid out (Broome 
& Perry, 2002). 
 
Another common type of financial reward system is a performance bonus which can be 
integrated into a wide range of contract types, including standard lump sum and cost 
reimbursable contracts. Simply, a performance bonus aims to motivate the contractor by 
providing a financial bonus that is additional to their prescribed fee for exceeding minimum 
acceptable levels of performance (Washington, 1997). In general, performance is evaluated 
ex ante and the reward is distributed from a separate client bonus pool specified at the start of 
a project. As the financial incentive is drawn from a separate bonus pool, there is a wide 
range of performance areas that can rewarded, including schedule, environmental, quality, 
safety and design performance targets. However, important to the success of bonus incentives 
are specific, mutually agreed and measurable targets. If the output deliverables cannot be well 
defined, then an incentivized contract should not be pursued (HM Treasury, 1991).  
 
Construction organizations are increasingly focusing their attention on promoting motivation 
through the application of financial reward systems that encourage inter-firm collaboration 
and effort. Yet, such organizations appear to have little understanding of the drivers of 
motivation that underpin these systems. This has resulted in lackluster performance. Despite 
the increased uptake of financial reward systems, there is little research into the impact of 
such systems on motivation in construction projects. This may be due to the complexity of 
the motivational environment and the potential difficulties in applying organization theories 
to a project context. This paper addresses this knowledge gap by developing an integrated 
framework that is suitable for examining the unique context of a construction project. The 
paper also presents contributions from psychological and economic motivation theory, and 
interprets the conceptual framework against the results of a successful Australian social 
infrastructure project case study. 
 
 
WORK MOTIVATION AND FINANCIAL REWARD SYSTEMS 
 
Work motivation can be defined as a set of external and internal energetic forces that initiate 
work-related behavior and ‘determine its form, intensity, direction and duration’ (Pinder, 
1998, p.11). This definition acknowledges the influence of both environmental forces (such 
as financial rewards and the nature of the task) and inherent forces (such as intrinsic motives) 
on behavior (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999).   
 
In a work environment, financial rewards and remuneration affect motivation, which in turn 
impacts on performance, via effort, choice and persistence (Locke and Latham, 2004). 
Mullins (1996) takes a broader view and argues that performance is a product of motivation, 
ability and the environment. Similarly, Howard et al. (1997) argues a construction 
contractor’s output is a function of factors within their control (ability and effort) and external 
factors outside their control (environment). These external factors are referred to as ‘noise’ 
elements in the economic literature (Baker, 2002) and introduce randomness into agent 
performance.  
 
Recently in experimental management literature, serious attempts have been made to 
integrate the key theoretical concepts across economic and psychological disciplines to 
investigate the impact of financial reward systems on motivation (e.g. Van Herpen et al., 
2005). These frameworks have been empirically applied to performance measurement and 
motivation at an organizational level, with there being little or no investigation of a project 
environment.  
 
Although construction management researchers have looked at motivation in a project 
environment, this appears to have been either from an economic perspective (e.g. Howard et 
al., 1997) or a psychological perspective (e.g. Leung et al., 2004), and never in combination.  
There appears to be no existing application of integrated theory to motivation in projects, let 
alone concerning motivation on construction projects, or financial reward systems in 
construction. This may be due to the complexity of the motivational environment in a 
construction project and the potential difficulties in applying organization theory to a 
construction project context. This paper addresses this knowledge gap by developing an 
integrated framework that is suitable for examining the unique context of a construction 
project (e.g. high levels of task interdependence and the strong influence of individual project 
team members on organizational performance). The paper first outlines key contributions of 
work motivation theories across psychological and economic disciplines.  
 
Work motivation theories 
 
As the cornerstone of psychological work motivation theory, cognitive theories attempt to 
understand the thought processes that mediate a person’s behavior in the workplace and argue 
that workers behavior is ‘purposeful, goal-directed and largely based on conscious intentions’ 
(Steers and Shapiro, 2004). Prominent cognitive theories of work motivation include goal 
setting theory and goal commitment, and justice/equity theory. From an economic 
perspective, principal agent theory is a dominant interpretation of organizational action in a 
contract setting and assumes an agent (individual or organization) is self-interested and risk-
averse. Recent work from experimental economists introduces other ideas that question the 
traditional principal agent relationship, such as the impact of social preferences and 
reciprocity on agent behavior. 
  
Goal setting theory and goal commitment 
 
According to Locke & Latham’s goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1984), individuals or 
groups make calculated decisions about their desired goals, and once the desired goals are 
identified, the goals themselves can act as a motivational force. For an individual to be 
committed to set goals, the goals must be challenging but realistic, clearly understood and 
meaningful. The theory also argues that for goals to promote effort, timely and accurate 
feedback is required at appropriate intervals. Feedback will inform an individual that 
progressive goals have been attained, thus maintaining effort levels. Under certain conditions, 
specific but difficult goals can lead to higher levels of motivation than vague or easy goals, as 
expressed in task goal theory (Locke & Latham, 1990). Recent literature on goal setting 
emphasizes the importance of goal commitment as a critical construct in understanding the 
relationship between goals, motivation and performance (Klein et al., 1999).  
 
A key theoretical construct behind goal commitment is expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). 
Expectancy theory forms the general framework for a wide variety of motivation research 
(Ambrose & Kulik, 1999) and outlines how individuals and groups make behavioral 
decisions according to various alternatives. It is based on the principle that individuals will 
adapt their behavior to achieve a desired outcome and will select the behavioral option with 
the greatest motivational force. Expectancy theory states that when an individual judges the 
motivational force (MF) of the behavioral option, three variables are considered. These 
variables are Expectancy, Instrumentality and Valence. Expectancy is the perception of the 
probability that one’s effort will attain desired performance goals. Instrumentality is the 
perceived probability that, if performance goals are met, the desirable outcome (reward) will 
be received. Valance is the perception of relative attractiveness or value an individual places 
on the desired outcome or reward.  
 
Hollenbeck & Klein (1987), as with Locke et al. (1981), used an expectancy theory 
framework to identify the antecedents of goal commitment. They argue that the major 
antecedents of goal commitment can be split into two categories: those that impact on the 
attractiveness of goal attainment and those that impact on the expectancy of goal attainment 
(Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987). Further research undertaken by Klein et al. (1999) confirmed a 
positive relationship between goal commitment, expectancy and attractiveness of goal 
attainment after analyzing the results of 174 published articles relating to goal commitment. 
 
Justice/Equity theory 
 
As the basis of justice theory, equity theory, originally developed by Adams (1963), argues 
that agents are motivated by their need for fair treatment and will develop comparisons 
between one another (referents) in determining what is fair, just and reasonable. Distributive 
justice is a key conceptualization of equity theory and refers to the perceived fairness of the 
amounts of compensation agents receive (Greenburg, 1987). Thus, for financial reward 
systems, distributive justice is determined by how fairly the required input is balanced against 
the outcome (e.g. money), and how this compares to the input/outcomes of others. The 
concept of justice and its impact on behavior and motivation has received a great deal of 
attention over the last three decades – initially focusing on distributive justice, with more 
recent work focusing on the justice of decision-making processes (that lead to decision 
outcomes), or what is termed as procedural justice (Colquitt, 2001). Procedural justice is 
delivered by adherence to fair measurement criteria such as clarity, consistency, correctability 
(flexibility), representativeness, accuracy, bias suppression and ethicality (Leventhal, 1980). 
If an agent believes the measurement procedures are inaccurate, it can impact on the 
effectiveness of a financial reward system (Moers, 2000).  
 
From the development of the two factor conceptualization of justice (distributive and 
procedural), a third type was identified and first introduced by Bies & Moag (1986). This is 
interactional justice, or the fairness of interactive treatment received as decision-making 
processes are undertaken. This third type of justice is fostered when decision-makers treat 
those agents whose performance is being judged with sensitivity and respect. Decision-
makers also need to provide agents with the rationale behind their decisions. There are still 
questions in justice research about the applicability of a three-factor conceptualization of 
justice. For example, some researchers have argued interactional justice is a subset of 
procedural justice (e.g. Moorman, 1991). Yet a recent meta-analysis (Cohen-Charash & 
Spector, 2001) claims to have found clear distinctions in the three justice types arguing they 
are each worthy of merit. Colquitt & Shaw (2005) agree, arguing that overall justice 
perceptions are based on each of the three justice types.  
 
Social preferences and reciprocity theory  
 
From an economic perspective, the ability of financial remuneration to motivate recipients is 
founded in principal agent theory, which is characterized by a principal (employer or client) 
who hires an agent (employee or contractor) to undertake actions on behalf of the principal to 
advance the principal’s objectives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As an extension to the 
traditional principal agent theory that assumes agents only do what they perceive to be in 
their self-interest (Howard et al., 1997), economic reciprocity theory states that agents 
actually prefer a condition of fairness in the exchange relationship with their principal. 
Depending on the behavior of the principal, the agent perceives the value of a financial 
reward as positive or negative. If the agent views the incentive’s intention as ‘calculative’ or 
hostile, the agent may view the incentive negatively, which can lead to a hostile response 
(Fehr & Falk, 2002). This reasoning is similar to justice theory as discussed in the cognitive 
theory literature, where the reward mechanism should be fairly applied so that rewards and 
measurement processes illicit their desired behaviors.  
 
 
INTERGATED FRAMEWORK 
 
There are current efforts to incorporate psychological theories into economic theory to help in 
the latter’s interpretation of organizational action. The ability of psychological theory to 
assist in explaining organization action is relevant here because a construction project can be 
interpreted as an organization. In the construction literature, Turner and Muller (2003) argue 
that project teams may be viewed as ‘temporary organizations’. Similarly, Eccles (1981) 
proposed an individual construction project might be regarded as a quasi-firm or a loosely 
coupled inter-organizational form. These interpretations suggest the potential value of 
applying psychological theories to motivation in a project environment. 
 
Given the minimal research into the impact of financial reward systems on motivation in 
construction a conceptual framework was developed to identify the contextual determinants 
that impact on incentive reward motivation. Figure 1 presents the integrated framework. In 
light of the potential to apply psychological motivation theory to interpret project 
organizational action, the authors developed a four-fold classification of motivation 
‘indicators’ that form the core construct of the framework. These indicators are: 1) Goal 
Commitment, 2) Distributive Justice, 3) Procedural Justice and 4) Reciprocity. Thus, this 
classification predicts that motivation towards financial reward goals in construction projects 
is strongly influenced by: 1) how attractive the achievement of the goal is to a contractor and 
how likely it is that they will be able to achieve the goal; 2) the contractors’ perception of the 
fairness of the reward in relation to their performance and other project team members’ 
performance and rewards; 3) the fairness of the performance measurement process; and 4) the 
contractor’s perception of the trustworthiness and transparency of their client. 
 
Figure 1 Integrated Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the motivation indicators, the motivation determinants are split into two 
categories: the impacting factors relating to the design of the financial reward system and the 
broader procurement initiatives that impact on motivation towards the reward goals. It is also 
assumed that greater effort may lead to increased responsiveness to incentive design and 
procurement initiatives, intensifying the motivational effect and providing a feedback loop. 
These framework constructs represent a theoretical contribution to construction management 
literature and proved instructive during the empirical phase of this project-based research. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
A case study methodology was chosen to empirically explore the determinants that impact on 
the four motivation indicators in a construction project context. This was seen as the best 
method given the complexity of project environments, and the need for in-depth 
understanding of the dynamics surrounding project-based motivation. The project case study 
presented in this paper was selected in a purposive manner, as it represents an example of the 
successful design and implementation of a financial reward system as part of the overall 
project procurement approach. 
 
Case study findings were triangulated across the following data sources: semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews, project and contractual documentation (including project briefs and 
minutes from meetings), industry publications, and a site visit. Extensive preliminary data 
were collected, which helped shape the questions asked during the interviews, as did the 
conceptual framework. The interviewees comprised eight senior managers; two from each of 
four key stakeholder types (client, head contractor, consultants and subcontractors) who were 
heavily involved in the procurement and delivery of the case project. As the unit of analysis 
was at the organizational level, interviewees represented the view of their organization as 
senior managers. All interviews were in-person and ranged from 60 to 90 minutes duration, 
and were based on structured and un-structured questions. Raw interview data was analyzed 
using content analysis. This involved manually aggregating and categorizing responses from 
the interview transcripts and the secondary data. The identification and refinement of 
categories was achieved by inductive coding. The primary data amounted to approximately 
Motivation Determinants 
 Financial reward design 
 Procurement initiatives 
Motivation Indicators 
 Goal Commitment 
 Distributive Justice 
 Procedural Justice 
 Reciprocity 
MOTIVATION/EFFORT 
8,000 words contained in interview transcripts. The coding process involved interpretation of 
each interviewee’s transcript and each coding category was revised and refined until clear 
lines could be drawn between the motivation determinants. Key themes were allocated labels 
in association with each motivation indicator and then categorized by (i) the financial 
incentive design and; (ii) the supporting procurement initiatives. To test content analysis 
accuracy and ensure inadvertent bias was minimized, an ‘expert panel’ was formed. Three 
expert panel members undertook their own category allocations, resulting in over 80% 
accuracy in comparison to the original coding; providing support for content analysis 
reliability. 
 
 
CASE PROJECT MOTIVATION 
 
The case project involved the design and construction of a major social infrastructure 
refurbishment with a budget of over $90 million. A key goal on the project was the 
achievement of a target completion date, as the government client had made a public 
commitment to open to the public by a set date.  Other project goals included defects-free by 
completion date, meeting all functionality and design requirements set out in the project brief 
(including environmental and safety goals), limiting errors and omissions in construction 
documentation and meeting the client budget. The general contract approach was a Managing 
Contractor – Construction Management (MC-CM) arrangement with extensive relationship 
management elements. This approach was chosen as it allowed the client control over the 
design process, but shared the cost risks associated with the design and construction. Despite 
using a standard form of contract, the additional relationship elements assisted in mitigating 
the design and construction risks taken on by the client, through closer integration of the 
project team and improved decision-making and problem resolution processes. It also 
established shared project goals against which performance could be assessed. This involved 
the abolition of the traditional hierarchical structure, replaced by a ‘round table’ approach that 
saw key representatives from each project organization form an Integrated Management 
Team (IMT) and Project Control Group (PCG). There were monthly IMT and PCG meetings, 
where open and honest communication was encouraged, in an equitable environment. A 
relationship consultant was also appointed to establish and formalize the management 
structure and facilitate relationship workshops and ongoing relationship coaching. This 
approach aimed to foster team commitment to the project goals. All project parties were 
contractually obliged to ‘act in good faith’. 
 
The financial reward system was intended to reward the contractor for efficiently managing 
the client’s risks, above their standard construction management fee. A positive performance-
based reward system was jointly agreed in the conceptual stages and aimed to reward three 
main areas of project performance: innovation contribution, contingency savings and ready-
for-use completion. As a key element of the system, the contractor could propose innovations 
that would achieve cost-savings and/or program savings while preserving functionality and 
quality. Once the innovation was agreed, 50% of the savings achieved would be placed in a 
cost savings incentive pool, while the other 50% was reinvested into the project. The 
incentive pool would be then paid to the contractor on the provision they achieved the target 
practical completion date.  By project completion, approximately AU$2 million in savings 
was achieved from innovations by the contractor. As the contractor achieved the finalized 
practical completion date, they were provided their portion of the incentive pool. The next 
section presents the elements of the reward system and overarching procurement initiatives 
that encouraged motivation towards these goals.  
 
Overall, the case project was considered a success by the project team, including the client. 
This success was partly attributed to the innovations that were encouraged through the 
financial reward system, and also to the procurement initiatives that motivated the project 
team to strive for the project goals – maximizing the impact of the reward system on team 
motivation. The following motivation determinants were nominated by the interviewees as 
influencing their goal commitment, distributive and procedural justice and reciprocity 
perceptions leading the achievement of the reward systems goals. The discussions of these 
determinants not only provide guidance to project organizations in the use of financial reward 
systems but also provide justification of the four-fold classification of indicators to explore 
construction project motivation.    
 
Although the share of innovation savings offered by the reward system had a direct 
motivating effect, the design of the reward system featured some elements that amplified this 
effect. For instance, a realignment of the financial reward goals late in the construction stages 
to meet changing project conditions promoted goal commitment (cited by seven of the eight 
interviewees) by improving the expectancy the goals could be achieved.  According to 
contractor representatives, the realignment of target goals “brought reality back” to an overly 
ambitious budget and program, restoring fairness in the incentive reward distribution, thus 
also reinstating distributive justice. Of note, motivation was constrained through perceived 
injustices in how the financial reward was to be distributed across the project team. Although 
those who had shared in the incentive reward valued it, seven of the eight interviewees 
perceived that the exclusion of the consultants from this incentive de-motivated the 
consultants and resulted in less value delivered from innovation than might otherwise have 
been the case. This supports the need to equitably distribute the financial reward across 
organizations who contribute to the successful achievement of goals. Also, according to five 
of the eight interviewees, the measurement of performance under the innovation incentive 
was unclear, impacting on perceptions of procedural justice. 
 
Despite elements of the financial reward design that amplified and constrained motivation, 
the case study results suggested that overarching procurement initiatives had a significant 
impact on how the reward system was perceived by project organizations. The modified MC-
CM contract supported an equitable allocation of design and construction risk under the 
project conditions according to the client and contractor representatives. These 
representatives attributed a fair allocation of risk to increased goal commitment, where the 
client encouraged the contractor’s expectancy that the innovation goal could be achieved. 
This was achieved by providing the contractor the financial flexibility to put resources into 
identifying innovative solutions. These representatives also agreed that the project’s contract 
and relationship elements promoted trust and reciprocity, where the contractor was 
encouraged to pursue the reward goals under the collaborative contract approach. Also, the 
establishment of the ‘round table’ senior management structure encouraged motivation 
towards the innovation goals (cited by five of eight interviewees) as it was seen to improve 
the team’s ability to control their performance, thus improving the expectancy that the project 
team could jointly attain the goals, promoting goal commitment. This structure also 
encouraged reciprocal behavior in dealing fairly with project issues such as the realignment 
of the project program to meet changing conditions. This was also encouraged by involving 
the contractor and key subcontractors in the early design process to fast track the 
commencement of the construction stage and improve constructability.   
 
Additionally, seven of the eight interviewees felt the relationship workshops throughout the 
project established a collaborative team culture which promoted motivation towards 
achieving the innovation goals and building the incentive pool.  This driver was found to be 
associated with an increase in the attractiveness of goal attainment, thus promoting goal 
commitment. The relationship workshops also encouraged fair and just behavior across the 
team by emphasizing the importance in forming a close working relationship, thus promoting 
reciprocity. The motivation induced through the project relationships was also promoted 
through the potential for future work opportunities and the desire to uphold reputation. 
According to five out of the eight interviewees, the potential for future work with the 
government client strongly encouraged motivation towards the reward goals. This was linked 
primarily to goal commitment; the attractiveness of goal attainment was increased through 
the desire to uphold a strong reputation, potentially leading to future work opportunities. 
Finally, the selection of the construction team through a value-based multi-criteria tender 
selection process promoted goal commitment, according to seven out of eight interviewees. 
The emphasis placed on recognition of previous experience and ability to deliver on the 
project goals over a traditional price-only selection process promoted key project goal 
commitment.      
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
With input from organizational management literature, and drawing on the literature covering 
psychological and economic theories of motivation, this paper presents an integrated 
framework that can be used to explore the impact of financial reward systems on motivation 
in construction projects. The case study results support the use of a four-fold classification of 
motivation indicators. Thus, project motivation is influenced by how attractive the 
achievement of the goal is to a project participant and how likely it is that they will be able to 
achieve the goal. Case study results also support the importance of fairness in the 
measurement and distribution of the reward in relation to performance. Finally, it is predicted 
that motivation towards the financial reward goals is influenced by the perception of the 
trustworthiness and transparency to encourage reciprocal behavior. There is overlap in the 
motivation theory literature and this paper has shown how the indicators can be effectively 
rationalized for application to a construction project context. 
 
As a practical contribution, this paper has presented a range of financial reward design and 
procurement initiatives that were found to encourage goal commitment, distributive and 
procedural justice, and reciprocity. In summary, motivation was influenced in the case project 
by the following: 
 
 Flexibility in realigning of project goals to meet changing project conditions; 
maintaining the relevance of the goals; 
 Equitable allocation of contract risk to allow the contractor financial flexibility to 
strive for the project goals; 
 financial reward offering to all project parties who directly contribute to goal 
attainment; 
 the formation of a collaborative project culture through relationship fostering 
activities such as relationship workshops and round-table senior management 
structures; 
 direct linkages between project performance and future work opportunities; and 
 selection of the construction team through a value-based multi-criteria tender 
selection processes to recognize previous experience and ability to achieve project 
goals. 
 
In light of the motivation indicators, the case study results also highlight the importance of 
situating financial reward systems within a complementary suite of interrelated project 
procurement initiatives that promote the recognition of high performance. According to 
literature on social preferences, it is predicted that without a supportive environment based on 
trust and fairness, contract agents may perceive the intention of a reward system as 
potentially calculative, and thus, will be less likely to be motivated to pursue its goals. Future 
quantitative research is planned to further extend the validity of the integrated framework 
across a broader range of construction project environments and to determine the sensitivity 
of the four indicators across different combinations of motivation theories. It is anticipated 
that such research will shed new light on this complex topic and result in further detailed 
advice on how reward systems should be designed to promote project organization 
motivation. Owing to the unique nature of construction projects with high levels of task 
complexity and interdependence, results are expected to vary in comparison to previous 
studies based on individuals or single-entity organizations. In the meantime, this paper has 
contributed to theory by confirming the value of the integrated framework to assist in 
understanding the nature of construction project motivation.  
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